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Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 3 (May, 1987), 647-661 
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES 
BY JEFFREY S. BANKS AND JOEL SoBEL1 
This paper studies the sequential equilibria of signaling games. It introduces a new 
solution concept, divine equilibrium, that refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring 
that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules 
out implausible sequential equilibria in many examples. We show that divine equilibria 
exist by demonstrating that a sequential equilibrium that fails to be divine cannot be in a 
stable component. However, the stable component of signaling games is typically smaller 
than the set of divine equilibria. We demonstrate this fact through examples. We also 
present a characterization of the stable equilibria in generic signaling games. 
KEYWORDS: Strategic stability, equilibrium selection, signaling, game theory. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tms PAPER INVESTIGATES the relationship between Kreps and Wilson's (1982) 
concept of sequential equilibria and Kohlberg and Mertens's (1986) concept of 
stability. It introduces a restriction on off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs that refines 
the set of sequential equilibria in signaling games. We call all sequential equilibria 
that satisfy our restriction on beliefs divine. For generic signaling games, every 
equilibrium contained in a stable component is divine. Moreover, the solution 
concept is restrictive enough to rule out all of the equilibria that Kreps (1985)2 
and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. Thus, divinity provides an independent 
theoretical foundation for discarding nonintuitive equilibria in signaling games. 
We provide a generic example to show that divine equilibria may not be 
contained in any stable component. However, the paper presents an explicit 
characterization of stability in terms of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. That is, 
an equilibrium of a generic signaling game is in a stable component if and only 
if it can be supported as a sequential equilibrium with restricted off-the-equili-
brium-path beliefs. Just as Kreps and Wilson (1982) characterize perfect equilibria 
for generic extensive-form games in terms of sequential equilibrium strategies 
and beliefs, our result characterizes stable outcomes for generic signaling games 
in terms of sequential equilibrium ·strategies and restriction on beliefs. The 
characterization may be a useful way to compute stable equilibrium outcomes 
and to evaluate the consequences of using stability to select equilibria in extensive-
forni games. 
Independent of our work, Cho and Kreps (1987) analyze the power of stability 
to select equilibria in signaling games. Their results closely parallel our own. 
They identify restrictions on equilibria similar to those embodied by divinity. In 
1 The original version of this paper was written while Banks was a graduate student and Sobel 
was a visitor at Caltech. We thank participants of Caltech, UCSD, and Rand Corporation Theory 
Workshops, Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps, and two referees for valuable comments. Sobel thanks 
Joe Farrell and Chris Harris for many conversations on related topics and the National Science 
Foundation for partial support under Grant SES 84-08655. 
2 Kreps (1985) stimulated our interest in this area. Cho and Kreps (1987) contains some of the 
results of this paper, 
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This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 23:13:09 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
648 JEFFREY S. BANKS AND JOEL SOBEL 
addition, they also state our characterization result (Theorem 3). Cho (1987) 
extends a restriction identified in Cho and Kreps to obtain a solution concept 
that refines the set of sequential equilibria in general extensive-form games. 
Our debt to the existing literature on solution concepts for noncooperative 
games is obvious. Recent work on this topic includes papers by Selten (1975), 
Kreps and Wilson ( 1982), and McLennan ( 1985), who present refinement concepts 
for extensive-form games; and Myerson (1978), Kalai and Samet (1984), and 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), who present refinement concepts for normal-form 
games. 
2. THE MODEL 
In this paper we analyze the equilibria of signaling games with finite action 
sets. There are two players, a Sender (S) and a Receiver (R). The Sender has 
private information, summarized by his type, t, an element of a finite set T. There 
is a strictly positive probability distribution p(t) on T; p(t), which is common 
knowledge, is the ex ante probability that S's type is t. After S learns his type 
he sends a message, m, to R; m is an element of a finite set M. In response to 
m, R selects an action, a, from a finite set A(m); k(m) is the cardinality of A(m). 
S and R have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions u(t, m, a) and 
v(t, m, a), respectively. 
For fixed T, M, and A(m) for m EM, the utility functions u(t, m, a) and 
v(t,m,a) completely determine the game. Therefore, if L=[fxI;'°! 1 k(i)]2, 
where f is the cardinality of T and M is the cardinality of M, then every element 
of IRL determines a signaling game. We call a property of a signaling game generic 
if there exists D c IRL such that the property holds for all signaling games 
determined by d ED and a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero contains IRL\D. 
If a property of a signaling game is generic, then we say it holds for generic 
signaling games. 
For any positive integer k, let ..::lk={8=(8(1), . . . ,8(k)): 8(i) :;o;: OVi and 
I~~ 1 8(i)=l} be the (k-1)-dimensional simplex. We refer to the (f-1)-
dimensional simplex most often; to simplify notation, we write ..:1 instead of ..:1 "f· 
A signaling rule for Sis a function q: T'..::l,w; q(mlt) is the probability that S 
sends the message m, given that his type is t. An action rule for R is an element 
of IlmEM..::lk<m>; r(alm) is the probability that Ruses the pure strategy a when 
he receives the message m. 
We extend the utility functions u and v to the strategy spaces Llk<m> by taking 
expected values; for all t E T, let 
u(t, m, r) = L: u(t, m, a)r(a Im), 
a c A(m ) 
v(t,m,r)= L: v(t,m,a)r(alm). 
a E A(m) 
Also, for each A E ..:1 and m E M let 
BR(A, m) = ~~~E~~~. ,~T v(t, m, r(m))A (t) 
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be the best-response correspondence for R and for Ac Llk(mh let BR(A, m) = 
u.\ E A BR(A, m). 
DEFINITION: A sequential equilibrium for a signaling game consists of signal-
ing rules q( t) for S, action rules r( m) for R, and beliefs µ ( ·Im) E Ll for R, such 
that (i) VtE T, q(m*I t)>O only if 
u(t, m*, r(m*)) =max u(t, m, r(m)); 
m E M 
(ii) VmEM, r(a*Jm)>O only if 
I v(t,m,a*)µ(tJm)= max I v(t,m,a)µ(tJm); 
I E T a E A(m) I E T 
(iii) ifI,ETq(mJt)p(t)>O, then 
µ(t*I m) = q(m I t*)p(t*) . 
LET q(m I t)p(t) 
In words, (i) states that q( ·)maximizes S's expected utility, given R's strategy; 
(ii) states that r( ·) maximizes R's expected utility, given beliefs µ( · ); and (iii) 
states that R's beliefs given S's strategy are rational in the sense that Bayes' Rule 
determines µ ( t Im) whenever the probability that S sends m in equilibrium is 
positive. If q(m It)= 0, for all t ET, then sequential rationality does not determine 
µ(ti m). However, the refinement concept introduced in Section 3 restricts the 
values that these beliefs may take. 
Next, we describe stable equilibria. Our introduction follows Cho and Kreps 
(1987). Fix a signaling game; let p=(pR,Ps) satisfy O<p;<l, i=R, S, and let 
ij and ; be strategies for Sand R respectively that satisfy ij(m It)> 0, Vm EM, 
Vt E Tand r(a Im)> 0, Va E A(m), Vm EM. A (p, ij, i}-perturbation of the original 
game is the signaling game in which, if the players choose strategies q and r 
from the original game, then the outcome is the outcome of the original game if 
the strategy chosen by S is (1- Ps) q + p5ij and the strategy chosen by R is 
(1-pR)r+ PR;. We refer to (p, ij, r) as trembles. Let (q, r) be Nash equilibrium 
strategies for a perturbed game. If q(m It)> 0, we say that a type t Sender 
voluntarily sends m and we say that R voluntarily uses the mixed strategy r( m ). 
For a given signaling game, we call a subset C of the set of Nash equilibria 
stable if, for every e > 0, there exists 8 > 0 such that every (p, ij, r)-perturbation 
of the original game with 0 < p; < 8, i = R, S has an equilibrium no more than e 
from the set C. 
DEFINITION: A stable component is a minimal (by set inclusion) stable set of 
equilibria. 
Our analysis depends on several facts about extensive-form games and stable 
sets.3 To state these facts, we need one more definition. Given an extensive-form 
3 Kreps and Wilson (1982) prove Proposition I. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) prove Propositions 
1-3. 
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game, the strategy choices for the players induce a probability distribution over 
the endpoints of the game. We call this probability distribution the outcome of 
the game (associated with particular strategies). 
PROPOSITION 1: For generic extensive-form games, the set of Nash equilibrium 
outcomes is finite and all Nash equilibria within a given connected component induce 
the same outcome. 
PROPOSITION 2: Every game has at least one stable component. 
PROPOSITION 3: A stable set of equilibria for a given game remains a stable set 
for the game obtained by deleting a strategy that is not a weak best response against 
any equilibrium in the set. 
Therefore, in generic signaling games, there exists a stable set of equilibria 
with the property that every equilibrium in the set agrees along the equilibrium 
path; the equilibria may vary off the equilibrium path. A variety of off-the-
equilibrium-path responses may be needed to guarantee that any perturbation 
of the game has an equilibrium path close to a particular equilibrium path. 
Therefore, a single equilibrium need not be a stable set. However, we use 
Proposition 1 to justify an abuse of terminology. We call an equilibrium stable 
if it agrees with an element of a stable component along the equilibrium path. 
In particular, in generic signaling games, if an equilibrium is stable, then every 
perturbation has an equilibrium with payoffs close to the original equilibrium 
payoffs. 
3. DIVINE EQUILIBRIA 
Previous refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept place rationality restric-
tions on zero-probability events. In particular, sequential rationality requires that 
players respond optimally to some consistent assessment of how the game has 
been played. These equilibrium concepts do not require a player to draw any 
conclusion when a zero-probability event takes place. That is, although the 
refinements concepts embodied in sequential rationality and perfectness require 
that equilibria of games induce equilibria on any continuation of the game, these 
concepts do not require that a player systematically draw an inference from an 
opponent's unexpected move. Nevertheless, in order to decide how to respond 
to an unexpected signal, R should evaluate the willingness of S-types to deviate 
from equilibrium, and then incorporate into his beliefs the information that 
deviations from equilibrium might reveal. 
This section presents an equilibrium concept that refines the set of sequential 
equilibria in signaling games by placing restrictions on off-the-equilibrium-path 
beliefs. We begin by describing two restrictions on beliefs along with the intuition 
behind them, and then proceed to define an equilibrium concept that incorporates 
these restrictions. 
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The first intuitive restriction on beliefs that we discuss requires R's off-the-
equilibrium-path beliefs to place zero probability on those Sender types who 
certainly lose from a defection. Formally, this condition requires that if a type t 
Sender receives utility u*(t) in equilibrium and J = {t: u*(t) > u(t, m, r(m)) for 
all r(m)EBR(Ll,m)}, then r*(m)EBR(LlT\Jom).4 Cho and Kreps (1987) also 
identify this condition and show that if an equilibrium is stable, then the condition 
must hold.5 Our refinement notion includes this type of restriction on beliefs. 
Figure 16 describes a special case of a sequential settlement game (see Salant 
(1984) or Sobel (1986)). There are two types of S (the "defendant"): type t2 
defendants are negligent; type t1 defendants are not negligent. S offers a low 
settlement, mi. or a high settlement, m2 • R (the "plaintiff") either accepts (a 1) 
or rejects ( a2 ) the offer. If R accepts S's offer, S pays R an amount that depends 
only on the offer. If R rejects the offer, S must pay court costs and a transfer 
depending only on his type (e.g. the court finds out with certainty whether or 
not S was negligent). If p(t1 ) = p(t2 ) =!,then the game depicted in Figure 1 has 
two types of equilibria. In one type of equilibrium, both types of S offer mi. and 
R accepts any offer; q(m 1 ItJ=1, i = 1, 2, r(a 1 Imj)=1, j = 1, 2. In the other type 
of equilibrium, both types of S offer m2 and R accepts m2 and rejects m 1; 
q(m1 Il;)=0, i = 1, 2, r(a 1 Im 1 )=0, r(a 1 I m2) = 1. In order to support this behavior, 
we need µ,(t1 lm 1 ),,,-;~. We claim that the second equilibrium is not plausible 
because, in order to support it, R must believe that t2 is more likely than t1 to 
offer m 1• However, t1 prefers to defect whenever t2 does (and not conversely: 
consider an equal mixture of a 1 and a2 given m1). Thus, a reasonable restriction 
on beliefs would require that the relative probability of t1 should increase if R 
observes m1• Our refinement notion captures this argument as well. 
Fix an equilibrium in which a Sender of type t obtains utility u*(t), and, for 
all t E T, the probability that t sends m is zero. We intend to restrict the beliefs 
that R can have given the message m. Since we deal with only one unsent message 
at a time, for notational convenience we drop the argument m from R's response 
function. 
Recall that Llk(m) consists of all actions, r, available to R given m. Let 
A 0 = { r E Llk(mJ: u( t, m, r):;;. u*( t), for some t E T} 
-3,3 -6,0 -5, 5 -6,0 
-3,3 -11, 5 -5, 5 -11, 5 
FIGURE 1. 
4 If J = T, then no action R can take in response to the signal m induces S to send m. In this case, 
any beliefs are permissible. 
5 Kreps (1985) suggests a less restrictive version of this condition. Kreps discards an equilibrium 
in which there exists a Sender type who would like to defect for every action in BR(ilT\1' m). 
6 We represent examples with a bi-matrix B(m) for each m EM. There is one column in B(m) for 
each strategy in A(m) and one row for each type. The entry in the tth row and the ath column is 
(u(t, m, a), v(t, m, a)). In each of these examples, the qualitative properties that we discuss in the 
text remain valid if we perturb the entries in B(m). 
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be the set of actions that some S-type weakly prefers to equilibrium actions, 
conditional on sending m. Our initial restriction is that R should believe that 
any type who sends m instead of the equilibrium signal does not expect to lose 
by doing so.7 Thus, if R receives the signal m (as a defection from equilibrium), 
he should believe that S expects him to take an action in Aa. 
For all r E .:1k(mh let 
fi(t, r) ={0~o, 1] if u(t, m, r) > u*(t), if u(t, m, r) = u*(t), if u(t, m, r) < u*(t), 
be the frequency that t E T would send m if he believes that m would induce the 
action rand t had a choice between sending m or obtaining u*(t). Next, let 
I'( r) = { y E .:1: 3 µ. ( t) E ji ( t, r) and c > 0 such that 
y(t) = cµ.(t)p(t), Vt ET}. 
Notice that I'(r) is nonempty if and only if rE Aa. If it is common knowledge 
that m induces r, then the posterior probability distribution over T must be an 
element of I'(r). Thus, I'(r) is the set of beliefs consistent with R taking the 
action r in response to m (and t earning u*(t) otherwise). 
Finally, let 
I'(A) =convex hull [ U I'(r)]. 
rEA 
Thus, if A is closed, then .f(A) is a closed, convex subset of the simplex .:1, and 
is empty if and only if Aa n A is empty. Since .f (.:1k(m)) is empty only if 
u*(t) > u(t, m, r), Vt E T, Vr E .:1k(mb R truly would be surprised by a defection 
from equilibrium, and there seems to be no reason to select one inference over 
another in response to m. Indeed, in this case, any conjecture supports the 
equilibrium. When Aa ;!; 0, and hence .f(.:1k(mJ) ;!; 0, we think that it is not 
plausible for R to hold beliefs outside of .f(.:1k(m)) given the signal m. If R 
observes a defection from the equilibrium path, then he must form a conjecture 
over T based on that defection. 
Notice that any equilibrium in which beliefs lie in .f (.:1k(m)) satisfies the intuitive 
restrictions that we described earlier. All conjectures in .f (.:1k(m)) assign zero 
probability to any tE T with u(t, m, r)<u*(t), Vre.:1k(rn)· Furthermore, ifthere 
exists t, t' E T such that ji ( t, r) = 1 implies ,U:( t', r) = 1, V r E .:1k(mh then for all 
beliefs in .f (.:1k(rnJ), the ratio of the probability of t' given m to the probability 
oft given m is at least as great asp( t')/ p( t). That is, R believes that t' is at least 
as likely to defect as t. 
Beliefs must lie in .f(.:1k<rnl) provided two conditions hold. First, R believes 
that no type t would use m if t expected R to take an action that resulted in 
7 It does not change our results to require that R believes that any type who sends m instead of 
the equilibrium signal expects to benefit strictly by doing so. Thus, we can use a strong inequality 
in the definition of Ac; . 
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utility less than u*(t). This means that S expects R to take actions in Aa given 
the signal m. Second, S-types have a common conjecture over the distribution 
of actions that R would take as a response to a defection. This second condition 
may seem odd, since there is only one Sender. However, a "type" is a specification 
of the information S has concerning decision parameters that are not common 
knowledge. Thus, it is possible for two S-types to have different conjectures over 
R's actions in equilibrium. If it is common knowledge that R holds beliefs in 
I'(£lk(mi), then S should expect m to induce an action in BR(T(ilk(mi), m). This 
observation suggests the following iterative procedure. Let 
I'o = 41, A 0 =ilk( ml> and for n > 0, 
rn = {I'(An-1) ~f ~(An-1) ~ 0, 
I'n-1 If I'(An-1)- 0, 
An=BR(I'n,m), I'*=nrn, A*=nAn. 
n n 
Others use iterative procedures in the definition of equilibrium concepts. 
Specifically, given the assumptions that S expects R to take actions in Aa given 
an unexpected signal m and that S-types have a common conjecture over the 
actions that R would take in response to m, our iterative procedure coincides 
with that used by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) to define the set of 
rationalizable equilibria. 
THEOREM 1: In generic signaling games, if an equilibrium in which q(m It)= 
OVtE Tis stable, then there exists r*EA* such that u(t, m, r*)~u*(t), VtE T. 
Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 3. It states that if an 
equilibrium is stable, then there exist beliefs in I'* that support it. We discuss 
the proof later in this section. 
DEFINITION: A sequential equilibrium in a signaling game is divine if it is 
supported by beliefs in r*. 
Thus, by Theorem 1, every stable component contains a divine equilibrium. 
Therefore, Proposition 2 implies our next result.8 
THEOREM 2: Every signaling game has a divine equilibrium. 
We believe that divinity captures a minimal restriction on off-the-equilibrium 
path beliefs. Stability implies much more, but we are not convinced that these 
restrictions are plausible. 
The set of beliefs in I'* depend on the prior distribution of Sender types. To 
check this property, one need only note that in the game that Figure 1 describes, 
I'*={A Eil: A(ti)~p(t1)} 
for the equilibrium in which both t1 and t2 send m2 with probability one. Let 
8 Strictly speaking, Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 imply the existence of divine equilibria in generic 
signaling games. A limiting argument, based on the upper hemi-continuity of divine equilibrium 
paths, establishes Theorem 2. Cho (1987) gives the details of a related argument. 
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I'** be the intersection of the I'* taken over all nondegenerate priors on Sender 
types. We can show that in generic signaling games, if an equilibrium is stable, 
then it can be supported by beliefs in I'**. Call an equilibrium supported by 
beliefs in I'** universally divine. To see that universal divinity is more restrictive 
than divinity alone, note that in Figure 1, the sequential equilibrium in which S 
sends m2 with probability one is divine provided that p(ti),;;;;~, but it is never 
universally divine since, regardless of the prior probability that S is ti. R must 
believe that the unexpected signal m1 comes from t 1•9 
Cho and Kreps use Proposition 3 to further refine the equilibrium set. Fix an 
equilibrium outcome and an unsent signal m. Proposition 3 guarantees that a 
stable outcome passes the never a weak best response criterion. That is, any stable 
outcome can be supported by beliefs that give no weight to any type t who for 
every sequential equilibrium giving rise to this outcome strictly prefers the 
equilibrium outcome to sending m 10 (if m is never a weak best response for all 
types, then the equilibrium payoffs strictly dominate any payoff S can obtain 
from a best response to m). This condition is more restrictive than universal 
divinity because for generic signaling games if m is ever weak best response for 
t, then e(t), the element of .:1 with tth component equal to one, is an element of 
I'**. 11 Thus, Proposition 3 also implies that in generic signaling games, if an 
equilibrium is stable, then there exist beliefs in I'** that support it. Since I'** c I'*, 
Theorem 1 follows from Proposition 3. 
4 . A CHARACTERIZATION OF STABLE EQUILIBRIA 
This section gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a sequential equili-
brium in a generic signaling game to be stable. First, we present an example of 
9 Harris and Raviv (1985) study a game in which there is a divine equilibrium that is not universally 
divine, hence not stable. Their comparative-statics analysis concentrates on the stable path. 
10 McLennan (1985) defines a refinement concept that is similar in spirit to this requirement. 
Specifically, call an action useless if it has a suboptimal payoff in every sequential equilibrium of a 
game (not just those equilibria in a stable component). McLennan shows that there exist sequential 
equilibria with beliefs restricted so that, at each information set, they assign positive probability only 
to nodes reached by the fewest useless actions. From this, McLennan recursively defines higher-order 
uselessness and arrives at a set of justifiable equilibria. In generic signaling games, only strongly 
dominated actions are useless; thus any divine equilibrium is justifiable. 
11 This condition is strictly more restrictive than universal divinity. In the game described in Figure 
2, there is a sequential equilibrium in which both S types send m1 with probability one and R takes 
a3 given m2 • It is straightforward to check that I'**= .:1. However, the never a weak best response 
criterion demands that R believe only 11 would send m2 • Hence R must respond to m2 with a,. As 
u( 12 , m2 , a,)= l > 0, the outcome is not stable. Cho and Kreps observe that in this example, the never 
a weak best response criterion demands that R believe that 11 sends the unexpected signal m2 , but 
the outcome in which both S types send m1 fails to be stable because 12 wishes to defect given 
µ(t, / m,) = 1. 
-ft' m 2 a, a2 a, a4 0,0 1, -1,3 I, 2 -1,0 1, -2 0,0 12 1, -2 1,0 -2, 2 -1,3 
FIGURE 2. 
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1, 0,0 
12 0, 0 
--tt "• az a3 a• 
-1,3 - 1,2 1,0 -1, -2 
- 1, - 2 1, 0 1, 2 -2, 3 
FIGURE 3. 
a signaling game that has an unstable, divine equilibrium. The example motivates 
the notion of stable beliefs that we need to prove our equivalence theorem. 
Consider the signaling game in Figure 3. Let p(t1) = .4. There exists a sequential 
equilibrium to this game in which q(m1 Il;)=1, i = 1, 2, r(a 1 Im2)=1 supported 
by beliefs µ ( 11 I m2) ~ ~- This equilibrium is universally divine since 
I'*= I'**= .1 
and a 1 E BR(I'*, m2). However, this equilibrium is not stable. 
The stable equilibrium for this example involves both t1 and t2 sending m2 
with probability one and R responding to m2 with action a3 • 
In this game R's best responses to m2 consist of all four pure strategies and 
mixtures between a; and a;+ 1 fori=1, 2, 3. Figure 4 plots the expected utility for 
both types of Sender given signal m2 • The horizontal axis represents R's response; 
points between two pure strategies represent mixed-strategy responses. (Figure 
4 shows that if S voluntarily sends m2 in an equilibrium to the perturbed game 
in which S expects to receive 0, then R must respond to m2 with an equal mixture 
of a 1 and a2 or an equal mixture of a3 and a4 .) 
If the equilibrium in which S sends m 1 with probability one were part of a 
stable component, then any perturbed game would have an equilibrium that 
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perturbed game in which R believes that the probability that t1 sent m2 is either 
less than or equal to one-third (so that R weakly prefers a4 ) or greater than or 
equal to two-thirds (so that R weakly prefers a 1). Moreover, t 1 voluntarily sends 
m2 only if R responds with a mixture of a3 and a4 that provides utility 0 to t1• 
Thus, t1 voluntarily sends m2 only if µ(t 1 jm2)=t in equilibrium. Similarly, t2 
voluntarily sends m2 only if µ ( t1 I m2) = j in equilibrium. Consequently, if we 
select a perturbation that induces R to select a3 given m2 if S does not voluntarily 
send m2, then this game cannot have equilibrium that yields both S types 0 
payoffs. With no voluntary use of m2, R believes that the probability of t1 given 
m 2 is between! and j. Thus, R would take a3 given m2 and destroy the equilibrium. 
R changes his belief only if S voluntarily sends m 2• However, if t1 voluntarily 
sends m 2 , then µ ( t1 I m 2 ) would exceed !. Since µ ( t1 I m 2 ) = t in any sequential 
equilibrium in which S receives 0 and t1 voluntarily sends mz. t1 does not 
voluntarily send m2 • Similarly, t2 does not voluntarily send m2 • This argument 
establishes that the sequential equilibrium in which S sends m1 with probability 
one is not stable. 
We next present a characterization of stable outcomes in generic signaling 
games. Fix an equilibrium that leads to utility levels u*(t) for all t ET and in 
which q(m It)= 0 for all t ET. We identify the set of actions that R could take 
given m in an equilibrium to a perturbed game in which S's payoffs are u*(t). 
In the previous example, this set consists of ai. a4 , mixtures of a1 and a 2 that 
place more weight on a 1 than on a 2 , and mixtures of a3 and a4 that place more 
weight on a4 than on a3 • It is useful to divide these actions into different sets, 
I(J), Jc T. 
I(J) = {rE Llk(m): u*(t);,,, u(t, m, r) Vt ET, and 
u*(t) = u(t, m, r) if t E J}. 
I(J) contaim those actions in which S types in J are indifferent between sending 
m or following the equilibrium path. 
Fix a perturbation that leads to a belief µ given m provided that S does not 
voluntarily send m. We wish to find conditions under which there exists an 
equilibrium to the perturbed game close to the original equilibrium. Doing this 
is easy if BR(µ, m) n I(J) 7" 0 for some J; in this case Sneed not voluntarily 
send m. Otherwise some non-empty set of S types J must voluntarily send m 
and therefore R must respond to m with an action r EI (J). If S types in J 
voluntarily send m, then R's equilibrium belief given m will be a convex combina-
tion ofµ and {e(t)},EJ where e(t) E L1 is the vector with tth component equal to 
one and all other components equal to zero. Thus, 
A(J, r) = {A E int Ll: :ZU * E L1 with rE BR(A *, m) such that 
A*= L a(t)e(t)+/3A,fora(t);,,,O, 1- L a(t)=/3>0}, 
I E } IE} 
is the set of beliefs A that cannot be "stabilized" through voluntary action by 
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types in J if R takes the action r. Finally, if 
{ n A(J,r) A(J) = ~1u> if/(J) ;6 0, 
if/(J) = 0, 
657 
and A*= njc TA (J), then A* consists of all of the perturbations that can be 
stabilized. This discussion motivates our characterization theorem. 
THEOREM 3: In generic signaling games, an equilibrium is stable if and only if, 
for all unused signals m, A* = 0. 
Cho and Kreps (1987) obtain the same result. The Appendix contains a proof 
of Theorem 3. 
5. EXTENSIONS 
While we confine our discussion in this paper to signaling games, Propositions 
1-3 hold for generic extensive-form games. Since these results combine to imply 
Theorems 1 and 2, we can use our techniques to rule out implausible sequential 
equilibria in more general extensive-form games. We suspect that divinity is easier 
to verify than stability and may be simpler to generalize to games with infinite 
strategy spaces. On the other hand, Theorem 3 and possible generalizations appear 
to be valuable only as a characterization of stable equilibria. 
We conclude by noting that our techniques do not refine the set of sequential 
equilibria in signaling games in which signals are costless. Specifically, let A(m), 
u(t, m, a), and v(t, m, a) be independent of m. These games are not generic, so 
we cannot apply our results directly. However, it is easy to verify that I'*= .:1 
for any unused signal. This is because if t induces the action a EA with signal 
m', then there exist beliefs for which a is a best response to the (unused) signal 
m. When signaling is costless, tis indifferent between sending m and m' and no 
other agent strictly prefers m to his equilibrium payoff. In addition, straightfor-
ward arguments show that stability does not restrict the set of equilibria, although 
this kind of game always has an equilibrium in which all types of S send the 
same signal and typically has other, more appealing, equilibria. Farrell12 (1984) 
and Myerson (1983) present ideas that apply to costless signaling games. Myerson 
presents an axiomatic solution that limits the outcomes in a mechanism-design 
problem that usually has a large number of sequential equilibria, but it is not 
clear that his ideas extend in a sensible way to a noncooperative framework. 
Farrell argues that an equilibrium outcome is not plausible if there exists an 
unused signal m, a nonempty set J, and an action r E BR (A, m) such that 
J = {t: u*(t) < u(t, m, r)}, where 
12 Grossman and Perry's (1986) concept of perfect sequential equilibria is similar to Farrell's 
concept. However, the perfect sequential equilibrium concept does not refine the equilibrium set in 
games with costless signaling. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 23:13:09 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
658 JEFFREY S. BANKS AND JOEL SOBEL 
if t E f, 
if t e J, 
is the conditional probability of t given t E 1. 13 That is, Farrell argues that R 
should interpret a defection that benefits exactly the set J as evidence that exactly 
those t in J use m. Farrell calls an equilibrium in which this type of defection 
does not exist neologism proof. Neologism-proof equilibria do not exist in general, 
and, in games with costly signaling, need not be divine. 
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APPENDIX 
We analyze an equilibrium in which a Sender of type t receives expected utility u*(t) and in which 
no Sender uses signal m with positive probability. 
First we discuss our genericity assumptions. We deal only with signaling games for which Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 apply. 
PROPERTY 1: In generic signaling games, an equilibrium in which all signals are sent with positive 
probability, taken by itself, is a stable component. 
We have not seen a proof of Property 1. Nevertheless, Property 1 follows from standard dimension-
counting arguments similar to those found in Kreps and Wilson (1982). Property 1 allows us to 
concentrate on unused signals when we characterize stable equilibria. 
In our proofs we use several other properties. To state these properties precisely, we must state 
explicitly a regularity condition. Let U(t, r; g(1)) = u(I, m, r) - (u*(1) -g(1)) be the gain over u*(t)-
g(1) to a Sender of type t if he sends m and R takes the action r in response to m. Think of g( ·) 
as a perturbation in payoffs due to small trembles. For fixed I and g( · ), viewed as a function of its 
second argument, U( ·) is a linear function defined on Llk<ml, the simplex of (mixed) strategies 
available to R given m. Let J be a nonempty subset of T with cardinality j; let F be an arbitrary 
j-dimensional face of Llk(mJ; and, for g( ·) fixed, let Uj: F"" R1 be the restriction of U( ·) to F for 
IE]. Thus, 
Uj(r; g(1))=(U(1, r; g(t))), IE]. 
Uj( ·) is linear in r E F. The regularity condition that we need is : 
(RC) the derivative of Of (r; 0) is nonsingular. 
(RC) is true generically for fixed u*(1). Even though the signaling game itself determines u*(1), (RC) 
holds for almost every signaling game as well. This result follows because the set of equilibrium 
payoffs to S when no one uses m is generically finite and does not depend on u(I, m, r). 
We need (RC) in order to establish the next property. Property 2 states that small perturbations do 
not change A* at a stable equilibrium in generic signaling games. To state this result, we need to 
introduce some notation. 
Fix a (p, ij, r)-perturbation and let ii(I, m, r) be the utility I receives if he sends the s!$nal m and 
R voluntarily takes the action r; let ii*( I) be an equilibrium utility to a 1-Sender; and let <P be derived 
from the perturbed game as <Pis derived from the original game. <ii depends on (fi, ij, r) and ii*(t). 
13 We have modified Farrell's definition to accommodate situations in which BR(A, m) is not single 
valued. 
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PROPERTY 2: In generic signaling games, if an equilibrium is stable, then for any e > 0 there 
exists a 8 > 0 such that there exists an equilibrium to any ( p, ii, r )-perturbation with 0 < p, < 8 for 
i = R and Sin which A*= A* and lu*(t)- u*(t)I < e. 
We omit the straightforward proof of this fact. 
For q=(q(l), . . . ,q(T)), q > O, defineµ.(-) by µ.(q)=(p(t)q(t )/ l.,.eTp(t')q(t' ))), I E T. When 
q(t) is the probability that t sends m, then µ.(q) is R's posterior belief on t given m. 
LEMMA 1: Jn a generic signaling game, if there exists an equilibrium in which A * "" 0 , then the 
equilibrium is not stable. 
PROOF: Assume that the equilibrium is stable. We argue to a contradiction. Fix A* EA*. If the 
original equilibrium is stable, then one can find e > 0 and 8 > 0 such that if any (p, ii. r )-perturbation 
with 0 < p, < 8 for i = R and S has an equilibrium such that 
(1) A*=A* 
and for every rE BR(A*, m), there exists t(r)E Tsuch that 
(2) u(t(r), m, r)> u*(t(r)) . 
Property 2 implies (1) directly; since A* EA* implies that for each rE BR(A *, m) there exists t(r) 
such that u(t(r), m, r ) > u*(t(r)) we obtain (2) from Property 2 by taking e and 8 small enough. In 
the perturbation, pick ii such that µ.(q) =A *. We can find ii because A* EA* c int ..:1. Consider an 
equilibrium to the (p, ii. r)-perturbation for which (1) and (2) hold. If; is R's voluntary action given 
m, then it follows from (2) that r Ii'. BR (A*, m ). Therefore, S must voluntarily send m in the equilibrium 
to the perturbed game. In order for S to be optimizing, there must be a nonempty subset J of T such 
that 
u*(t) = u(t, m, F) if t E} and 
u*(t) > u(t, m,F) if I Ii'. J. 
In the equilibrium to the perturbed game, a Sender of type t voluntarily sends m only if t E J. 
Therefore, if A(I) is R's posterior probability of I given m, then 
A(I) = c(p5 p(t)ii(t I m)+(l-p5 )p(t)q(t)) 
where O,,; q(1) ,,; 1, q(t)=O for tel, and the condition AE..:1 determines the value of the positive 
constant c. If we let 
{3=cp5 l. p(t)ii(t) and a ( t)=c(l-p5 )p(t)q(t) fort E J, 
reJ 
then a(t) ;. O, {3=1-Le1 a(t) > O, and}=f3A*+Le1 a(t)e(t ). Hence, A*eA(J,r). This is a 
contradiction since by (1 ), A* EA*= A* c A (J, F). Therefore, ifthe equilibrium is stable, then A *= 0 . 
Q.E.D. 
Now we show that if A*= 0 for all unused signals, then the equilibrium is stable. We establish 
this in two steps. First, we show that if A* = 0 , then with an arbitrarily small amount of voluntary 
action, we can fix the off-the-equilibrium-path strategies so that they do not disrupt an equilibrium 
with payoffs close to u*(t). The second step of the argument shows that a tremble does not disrupt 
the equilibrium path. 
LEMMA 2: In a generic signaling game, if A*= 0, then there exists g > 0 such that for any 11 > 0, 
there exists p > 0 such that if lu*(t) - u*(t )I < g for all t and 0 < p, < p for i = R and S, then for any 
( p, ii, r)-perturbation there exists q( t), r, and Jc T such that 
(3) u(t,m,r) < u*(t) ift li'. J, 
(4) u(t,m,r)=u*(t) ift E J, 
(5) q(t)=O iftli'.J, 
(6) O,,; q(1),,;11 iftEJ, and 
(7) r E BR(A,m), where Aul and A=µ.[p5 ii+(l-p5 )q] forsomec > O. 
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Lemma 2 states that if ii*( t) represent equilibrium payoffs to a perturbed game, then we can find 
voluntary strategies q( t) and r such that r is a best response for R given m in the perturbed game 
(condition (7)), q(t) is an equilibrium strategy for S in the sense that q( t) > 0 only if the Sender of 
type t expects a payoff of ii*(t) if he uses m (conditions (3), (4), and (5)), and that the probability 
that S voluntarily uses m is arbitrarily small. 
PROOF: Pick g> 0 and PR> 0 so that if lii*(t)- u*(t)I < g for all t and 0 <PR< PR, then for all 
q and ;, A* =A* = 0. This is possible by Property 2. Since A* = 0, there exists a nonempty set 1, 
an action i', and XE "1 such that (3) and ( 4) hold, r E BR (A, m ), and 
X(t) = f3p(t)q(t) + a(t) 
for some a(t) with a(t);.O, a(t)=O for tel, and 1-LE1 a(t)={3>0. Let q(t)=O for tel, and, 
for t E 1, let 
q(t) = [ (a(l)p5 ) ,.~Tp(t')q(t'I m) ]/[{3(1-p5 )p(t)]. 
This choice of q( t) satisfies (5) and, since {3 > 0, q( t):;. 0. A simple computation confirms that 
A=µ.(t;p5 q+(l-p5 )q). Therefore, there is a p5 >0 such that if0<p5 <p5 , then (6) holds. This 
establishes the lemma for p =min (PR, p5 ). Q.E.D. 
To complete the proof of Theorem 3, we construct an equilibrium to a perturbed game by piecing 
together strategies identified in Lemma 2, which we designed to be equilibrium behavior in the 
perturbed game off the path of the original equilibrium, with strategies that support an equilibrium 
to the perturbed game on the original equilibrium path. Therefore, we must restrict attention to only 
those signals used in the original equilibrium. For sufficiently small perturbations of this game, we 
can find an equilibrium close to the original equilibrium. Moreover, we can do this even if we save 
a small amount of S's strategy to control the off-the-equilibrium path trembles. This is a consequence 
of Property 1, but we must be a bit careful because the construction in Lemma 2 does not guarantee 
that each type of S voiuntarily sends m with the same probability. We need to introduce another 
concept. For O.;; v(t)< 1, av-pseudo-equilibrium to a signaling game consists of strategies q and r 
for S and R, respectively, such that 
r( m) E ,:lk(m) is a best response to q given m, 
q is a best response to r, 
q(m It) ;.O and LmEM q(m It)= 1- v(t). 
Thus, if v(t) = 0 for all t, then a v-pseudo-equilibrium is an equilibrium. If u*(t) is the payoff to a 
Sender of type t in a pseudo-equilibrium, then 
u*(t)=max L u(t,m,a)r(alm). 
mEM aEA(m) 
For our purposes, we obtain an equivalent concept if we allow the tremble Ps in the definition of 
stability to depend on the type of Sender. The next lemma follows from Property 1. 
LEMMA 3: In generic signaling games, for any equilibrium in which every signal is sent with positive 
probability and for every e > 0, there exist p > 0 and 'T/ > 0 such that if 0 < p, < p for i = R and S and 
if O.;; v(t).;; 'T/ for any t, then any (p, q, r)-perturbation has a v-pseudo-equilibrium within e of the 
original equilibrium. Moreover, S's utility in the pseudo-equilibrium does not depend on v. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: Lemma 1 proves one implication. To complete the proof, we must show 
that if A*= 0 for all unused signals m, then the equilibrium is stable. We assume that there is only 
one unused signal. This does not change the substance of the proof. We may take e in the definition 
of stability to be less than g of Lemma 2. Pick 'T/ in Lemma 2 equal to the smaller of f' and 'T/ 
(corresponding to the given e) in Lemma 3 and the 8 in the definition of stability equal to the 
minimum of the p's from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. For any ( p, q, i')-perturbation with 0< p, < 8 for 
i= Rand S, first compute the payoffs ii*(t) from Lemma 3. By construction, next we can apply 
Lemma 2 to obtain the perturbed-equilibrium voluntary strategies q(m It). The manner in which we 
selected 8 and 'T/ guarantee that 0.;; q( m I t),,;;; TJ. Consequently, we may apply Lemma 3 with v( t) = 
q(m It) in order to obtain strategies for S for signals used in the original equilibrium, that describe 
equilibrium behavior for S in the perturbed game. This construction provides an equilibrium to the 
perturbed game within e of the original equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
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